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OPINION OF THE COURT
McKee, Circuit Judge:
2Dennis Davenport appeals the district court’s denial of his suppression motion and
the ensuing sentence that was imposed following his unconditional guilty plea to
possession of powder cocaine and cocaine base with the intent to distribute in violation of
24 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A).  Davenport argues that the district court erred in
not suppressing the physical evidence seized from his residence because no exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless entry and search. He also claims that the district
court erred in concluding that the controlled substance involved was crack cocaine, and in
imposing a dangerous weapon enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)   For the reasons
that follow, we will affirm.
I. Background
On January 6, 2000, a cooperating informant acting at the direction of the Drug
Enforcement Agency, placed a series of monitored telephone calls to Davenport during
which he negotiated the purchase of approximately 5.5 ounces of crack cocaine for $5,000. 
During those calls, Davenport stated that he would “cook” the cocaine himself from powder
he had at his residence at 1006 Anchorage Street, Wilmington Delaware.  Thereafter, the
informant went to that address, and received approximately 153.2 grams of crack cocaine
from Davenport for $5,000.  Subsequent chemical analysis determined that the substance
Davenport sold on that occasion was a mixture of cocaine base and benzocaine weighing
153.2 grams.
From February 15, 2000, through February 17, 2000, Davenport had a series of
monitored telephone conversations with the informant as well as another meeting at
3Davenport’s residence. During those conversations, the informant negotiated the purchase
of approximately nine ounces of “crack” from Davenport at a price of $1,050 per ounce.
On March 3, 2000, DEA agents again monitored a telephone conversation between
the informant and Davenport. During that conversation, Davenport stated that he had the
nine ounces of crack and would deliver it to the informant later that same day at
Davenport’s Anchorage Street residence.  A few hours later, at approximately 5:00 pm,
DEA agents arrested Davenport several blocks away from his home.  Shortly thereafter, the
agents entered Davenport’s residence without a warrant.  Once inside, they apparently
waited for confirmation that a search warrant had been obtained from a magistrate judge. 
After agents confirmed that a search warrant had been obtained, they began searching
Davenport’s residence.  While searching the kitchen they found approximately 240.8 grams
of a substance they believed to be crack cocaine, approximately 125 grams of powder
cocaine, a digital scale, a pot containing cocaine residue, a case for a handgun, and a
magazine for a .9mm handgun. That magazine fit a .9mm handgun they subsequently found
in Davenport’s second floor bedroom. 
Based upon this investigation and search, a federal grand jury returned a three count
indictment charging Davenport with distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (Count I); possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (Count II); and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1))C) (Count III). 
Following indictment, Davenport moved to suppress the physical evidence that had
4been seized during the search of his residence.  He argued that since police entered his
home without a warrant and without exigent circumstances, all of the “fruits” of that search
were tainted and had to be suppressed.  He insisted that the warrant that was subsequently
obtained was irrelevant because police had nearly an hour to search and/or plant evidence
before the warrant was ever obtained. 
The district court denied Davenport’s suppression motion. The court reasoned that,
even assuming arguendo that the initial warrantless entry was illegal, the evidence was
nevertheless admissible under the “independent source” doctrine pursuant to the holding in
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).  However, before making that ruling, the
court gave Davenport an opportunity to present any evidence he had that police either
seized evidence before obtaining the warrant, or that they “planted” some or all of the
evidence they seized. Davenport responded to the court’s invitation for such a hearing by
sending a letter advising that a hearing on that issue was not necessary because he had no
proof to support those claims.  Accordingly, the court declined to accept Davenport’s
unsupported allegation.  Rather, the court concluded that Davenport’s involvement with the
informant furnished probable cause, and that the search warrant was not based upon anything
police learned from their initial intrusion.  Accordingly, the court concluded that the
evidence was obtained independently of the initial warrantless entry, and denied the motion
to suppress.
Thereafter,  Davenport appeared before the district court and pled guilty to Count II
of the indictment pursuant to a written plea agreement that contained a stipulation as to the
5weight and identity of controlled substances attributable to Davenport for purposes of
sentencing.   In that Plea Memorandum, Davenport and the government agreed that 394
grams of “crack” cocaine base were attributable to him along with 125 grams of powder
cocaine.  
Moreover, during the Rule 11 colloquy, the district court specifically stated the
weight of the drugs involved in Count II, and told Davenport that the substance involved was
“crack” cocaine base.  Davenport  indicated that he understood the charge against him, and
admitted that he was pleading guilty to knowingly possessing with intent to distribute the
substance attributed to him.  At no point during the colloquy did Davenport object to
characterizing the substance as “crack” cocaine, or suggest that the “cocaine base”
stipulated to in the plea agreement was anything other than “crack.”
Following the court’s acceptance of the plea, but prior to sentencing, Davenport did
request a hearing on the identity of the controlled substance attributed to him.  The court
responded by noting that Davenport had already stipulated to the identity of the substance
and informing Davenport that it would not conduct a hearing on that issue so long as the
government had disclosed its lab report to him.  However, the court did give Davenport the
option of proceeding with the sentencing under the terms of the plea agreement, or
withdrawing his guilty plea and proceeding to trial.  Following a brief recess, Davenport
informed the court that he had decided to proceed to sentencing. 
At sentencing, Davenport objected to enhancing the sentence for possession of a
firearm in connection with the drug distribution under the guidelines noting that he had not
     1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.
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agreed to any such enhancement in the plea agreement.  However, after hearing testimony
and argument on that issue, the court imposed a two level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1).  The court also granted a three-point downward adjustment based upon
Davenport’s acceptance of responsibility.  Davenport was then sentenced to 168 months of
imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release.  This appeal followed.1
II.  Discussion
As noted above, Davenport makes three arguments on appeal. We shall take each
argument in turn.
A. The Suppression Ruling
Davenport argues that “the warrantless entry into [his] residence . . . was, ab initio,
unreasonable and its unreasonable, ‘bad in law’ character should not change because it was
followed by a search pursuant to a lawful warrant.”  Appellant’s Br. at 23.  However,
Davenport did not preserve this argument by entering a conditional guilty plea. Rather, his
plea was an unconditional one pursuant to a plea agreement that did not include any
suggestion that Davenport was preserving the right to challenge the suppression ruling. 
Accordingly, his challenge to the suppression ruling has been waived. See Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).  Moreover, Davenport could not prevail on this
argument even if he had not waived it. 
Even now, Davenport does not suggest that the DEA agents actually planted
7evidence, or that they used evidence from the initial warrantless entry to obtain the search
warrant.   Rather, he merely argues that the warrantless entry tainted anything that was
seized thereafter because the search was void “ab initio.”  However, since he concedes that
there is no evidence that police either planted evidence or exploited the initial entry by
relying upon it to obtain the warrant, it is clear that the district court’s application of the
independent source doctrine was proper. See United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 712 (3d
Cir. 1989). 
B. The District Court Properly Attributed “Crack” to Davenport. 
Davenport argues that the district court erred in concluding that the cocaine base
attributed to him was “crack” cocaine under the Sentencing Guidelines.  “Cocaine base” as
used in the guidelines “means ‘crack’ . . . the street name for a form of cocaine base,
usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and usually
in a lumpy rock like form.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 ©), Note (D).  In order for the crack cocaine
sentencing enhancement to apply under the guidelines, the government must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the cocaine base attributable to the defendant is “crack”
under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. United States v. Holman, 168 F.3d 655 (3d Cir. 1999).
Davenport’s challenge to this enhancement is based upon our decision in United
States v. James, 78 F.3d 851, 855 (3d Cir. 1996), wherein we noted that Congress did not
intend to apply the § 2D1.1 enhancement to forms of cocaine base other than crack
cocaine.  In James, we stated that although a sentencing court can consider a defendant’s
admissions during a guilty plea colloquy in determining if the crack enhancement applies, a
8“casual reference” by the government to crack during a plea colloquy does not satisfy the
government’s burden. See also, United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1997); and
United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 1997).
Davenport therefore argues that the references to crack on this record are not
sufficient to support the sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines.  The
laboratory report establishes that sodium bicarbonate was not present in the cocaine base
attributed to Davenport under Count II. Davenport reminds us that the report describes the
153.2 gram seizure as “cocaine base plus benzocaine,” and the report only refers to the
240.8 gram seizure as “cocaine base.”  He then claims that since the DEA laboratory report
does not conclude that the substance seized from him was crack cocaine, the government’s
proof was not sufficient to apply the enhancement for crack cocaine. See Appellant’s Brief
at 28.  Davenport’s argument is therefore bottomed on the chemical analysis which
concluded only that the analyzed substance was “cocaine base” and that a sample included
benzocaine. Id., at 29.  Davenport insists “One Hundred and Fifty Three point Two (153.2)
grams of controlled substance were determined to be cocaine base plus benzocaine, which
is not ‘crack’ cocaine.” Id.  
However, we recently clarified that the sentencing enhancement for what is
commonly referred to as “crack” does not turn on the presence of any particular cutting
agent.  Thus, although crack is usually produced by “cutting” cocaine powder with sodium
bicarbonate, the absence of any particular additive does not establish that a drug is
something other than “crack.” United States v. Waters, 313 F.3d 151, 156-7 (3d. Cir.
92002).   
Moreover, the plea agreement that Davenport freely entered into with the
government stipulates that 394 grams of “crack” cocaine base, and 125 grams of powder
cocaine would be attributed to him for purposes of sentencing. See App. Exh. B at ¶ 3. 
Paragraph 2 of that agreement further provides that Davenport stipulated that he “possessed
with the intent to distribute more than 50 grams of the ‘crack’ form of cocaine base.” Id., at
¶ 2.  As noted earlier, Davenport’s plea was entered unconditionally and he has therefore
waived any issue as to the identity of the controlled substance that he stipulated to.   It is
axiomatic that “[a] knowing and voluntary plea constitutes an admission of all material facts
alleged in the indictment, even where those facts are not essential elements of the offense
charged.” United States v. Faulks, 143 F.3d 133, 138-39 (3d Cir.1998).  
Ironically, we have tried to minimize the very problem exemplified by Davenport’s
challenge to the enhancement by encouraging prosecutors to incorporate stipulations as to
the identity of the drugs into plea agreements. In United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136,
141 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997), we stated:
[W]here a written plea agreement is entered questions of
notice and proof at sentencing could be greatly minimized by
simply including language in the plea agreement by which a
defendant acknowledges the identity of the drugs involved. 
That is precisely what occurred here, yet Davenport still attempts to argue the district court
erred in concluding that the enhancement for crack cocaine applied.  We reject Davenport’s
eleventh hour attempt to rescind the stipulation he freely entered into in his plea
     2  Moreover, while negotiating the sale of these drugs with the DEA informant,
Davenport consistently referred to the drugs as “crack,” and he also referred to himself as a
“cooker.” This is clearly a reference to the process of converting cocaine powder into
crack cocaine.  See Waters, 313 F.3d at 156.
     3 We also reject Davenport’s attempt to distinguish between drugs actually seized from
him, and drugs attributable as “relevant conduct” for the same reasons. See Appellant’s Br.
at 32. (“[T]he government intermingled the amount of controlled substances that should
have been attributed for purposes of the underlying offense with amounts of controlled
substance that might have been considered as ‘relevant conduct’ for purposes of
enhancement.”).  The distinction Davenport attempts to draw is illusory. The enhancement
applies to drugs charged in a count of conviction as well as to drugs attributed as relevant
conduct. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, United States v. Pollard, 986 F.2d 44, 47 (3d Cir.1993). 
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agreement.2
 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that the
record supported application of the “crack enhancement” under the Sentencing Guidelines.3
C. The Firearms  Enhancement Was Properly Applied.
Davenport argues that the district court erred in applying a two level enhancement
for possession of a firearm pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).  He claims that the
evidence was not sufficient to establish the necessary nexus between the firearm and his
drug activity. We review the court’s conclusion that Davenport possessed weapons in
furtherance of his drug activity under a clearly erroneous standard. We will reverse that
factual determination only if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220 (3d Cir.1991). 
The relevant provision of the guidelines provides for a two level increase if a
firearm is possessed in connection with the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
11
Application Note 3 to § 2D1.1.(b)(1) states that "[t]he adjustment should be applied if the
weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was not connected with
the offense." See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1), 2D1.1, comment. (n.3), 18 U.S.C.A. Thus, the
government is not required to prove that a given weapon was actually used in relation to the
charged offense. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 732-33 (3d Cir.1994).
Here, the undisputed facts of record establish that Davenport was using his home to
sell cocaine.  Davenport sold the informant drugs there on one occasion, and the informant
arranged another purchase from that location that was to take place on the day Davenport
was arrested.
While searching Davenport’s home police fond a .9mm handgun at the very time
Davenport had arranged to sell more drugs to the informant.  As noted above, that gun was
found in a bedroom on different floor than the drugs and drug paraphernalia. However,
during the sentencing hearing, Detective Henry Cannon, a fifteen year veteran police
officer with experience in both the Wilmington Police drug unit and the DEA Task Force,
testified that drug dealers typically use firearms to protect their product, cash and personal
well being. 
Moreover, even though the gun was not found in close proximity to the drugs or drug
paraphernalia, a loaded magazine that fit the gun was nearby as was other evidence that the
firearm was used in connection with the drug business.  Accordingly, we hold that the
district court's factual findings were not  clearly erroneous and that the court did not err in
imposing the two-level firearm enhancement.
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IV. 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Theodore A. McKee           
Circuit Judge
